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The analysis of the effects ofcapital gains taxation requiresa careful modelling both of the details of thetax code and the imperfections inthe capital market. Under the standard
assumptions concerning perfect capitalmarkets and under the standard idealizationsof the tax code, thereare several strategies by which rational investors can avoidnot only all taxes on theircapital income; these strategies leave individuals
consumption and bequests in each state ofnature and at each date unchanged from
what they would have been in theabsence of taxes. Although certain detailed provisions ofthe tax code may limit theextent to which rational investors can avail themselvesof these tax avoidanceactivities, there are ways, in a perfect capitalmarket, by which the effects of theserestrictions can be ameliorated. Accordingly,
any analysis of the effects of capitaltaxation must focus on imperfect capitalmarket.
If individuals face limitationson the amounts which they can borrowand/or if there are limitations
on short sales, then under somecircumstances there is a locked—in effect (individuals donot sell securities which they wouldhave sold in the absence of taxation); butunder other circumstances individualsare induced to sell securities that they otherwise
would have held, in order to takeadvantage of the asymmetric treatment ofshort term losses and long termgains. A policy of realizing gains as soon as they become
eligible for long term treatment dominates the policy of Postponing therealization of capital gains,provided the gains are not too large.
A simple general equilibriummodel is constructed within whichit is shown that the taxation of capitalgains may increase the volatility ofasset prices, andlead individuals not to tradewhen they otherwise would.While the analysis casts doubt on the significance ofthe welfare lossesresulting from these exchange inefficiencies,there are circumstances in whichthe tax leads to production in-
efficiencies, e.g. terminating projectsat other than the sociallyoptimal date.
Finally, we argue that the focus of
some recent policy debates on theshort run revenue impact of a decrease in thetax rate on capital gains ismisplaced: even when the short run revenueimpact is positive, consumptionmay increase (thus exacer- bating inflationary pressures) andprivate savings may decrease (thusleading to a lower level of investment in the
private sector). Moreover, there issome pre- sumption that the long run revenueimpact is negative.
Our analysis has some importantimplications for empirical research.In par- ticular, it suggests that the impact ofthe tax is not adequatelysummarized by a single number, such as the "effectivetax rate" representing theaverage ratio of tax payments to capital gains.
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Thispaper is concerned with the economic effectsof capital gains taxation.
The tax on capital gains isone of several taxes imposed on thereturns to capital.
We are concerned with thoseeffects which arise out of thedistinguishing features of
capital gains taxation ——inparticular, from the facts that the tax islevied only
upon realization of thegains andthatthe tax imposed is a functionof the length of
time that the aset has been heldand the circumstancesupon which the gain is realized.
We began our analysis byasking how would rational investors,facing an idealized
fo of the U.S. capital
tax structure, behave in a perfectcapital market. We
obtained a set of results,which were perhaps lesssurprising to those in the investment
communitythan to the evidently
poorer academic economists who havepreviously analyzed
the effects of capita].gains taxation: with the U.S. taxstructure there are a variety
of ways by which (with aperfect capital market) a rationalinvestor may avoid not only
all taxes on capital, but alsotaxes on labor income as well. Sincetaxes may be
avoided, taxes are non—distortionary; and
since there are a variety ofways by which
taxes can be avoided, there isnot a single optimal tax reductioninvestment strategy.
The conclusion that allrational investors can avoid alltaxation in a peifect
capital market has an easily testable
implication: the government shouldcollect no
tax revenues from such individuals.The fact that the government doesin fact collect
a considerable amount of revenueimplies that either (a) most individualsare not
rational, well informed investors; (b)capital markets are not perfect;or (c) in the
modeling of the tax structure, I have
ignored some important details, whichlimit the
extent of applicability of the taxavoidance schemes. There isundoubtedly some truth
in each of these explanations
i argue, however, that whilea number of the detailed
provisionsof the tax code make itniore difficult for individuals toengage in these
tax avoidance schemes, andimpose a slightly higher order ofcleverness on the would—2—
he tax avoider, the level of sophistication requiredis still far lower than that
typically assumed in the modern finance literature.Imperfections in the capital
market (limitations' on individuals ability to borrowand to sell securities short)are,
I suspect, crucial.1 Part II of the paper isthus concerned with the implications for
investment strategies of capital gains taxationin an imperfect capital market, in
which investors are limited in the amount which they canborrow (and/or sell short)
while part III discusses the welfare implicationsof capital gains taxation. Part IV
discusses briefly the macro—economic consequencesof changes in the capital gains tax
rate.
Part I
1.Tax Avoidance In Perfect ita1_Narkets
In this section, we show that with perfect capital markets,no restrictions on
loss offsets or wash sales, there are at least fouralternative investment strategies,
all of which yield equivalent results: the individualis able to avoid completely
paying any taxes, not only on his investment income,but also on his wage income.
Consumption of the individual in each stateof nature is identical to what it would
have been the absence of taxation. All that the tax systemdoes is to induce a set of
essentially meaningless financial transactions,but these transactions, though intended
to avoid taxes, look very much likeconventional "real transactions" (of the kind that
one would observe in the absence oftaxation).
The four strategies entail
(1) Postponement of the realization of all long term gains:the "locked'in"
strategy. We shall refer to this policy asthe policy of postponed realization,
or the "locked in" policy.
(2) Realization of all losses while they areshort term, and of all gains as
soon as they become eligible for long termtreatment. We shall refer to this
as the policy of immediate realization.
(3) Borrowing to purchase assets which areincreasing in value; we shall refer—3.-
tothis as the indebtednessstrategy.
(4) Buying and selling highlycorrelated.securitjes so that at the endof the
year, one is in a position to realize lossesto offset income from other
sources. In SUCCOSSIVe years, oneengages in similar transactions to offset
both the gains realized fromprevious transactions of thissort and current
wage income.(This is whatstraddles on the commodity narketare designed
todo.) Weshall refer to thisstrategy as the lossroli—overstrategy.
Although, with perfect capitalmarkets, these four strategies areequivalent, with
imperfectcapital markets they are not.
There are three critical
properties of perfect capItal marketsrequired by our
analysis:
(1) There are no restrictionsonborrowing;there is a singe tVsafetl rate of
interest (which is the same forborrowing and landing).
(2) There are no restrictions
on short sales; and when an individualsells a
security short, he receives thecurrent value of the security aspayment.2
(3)Thereare notransactiorscosts.
In addition, we make use inour analysis of six properties ofa tax system.3'
(i) There is no tax oncapital gains realized at death.
(ii) There are no restrjctioiison wash sales.
(iii) There are no restrictions
on the ability to use capital lossesto offset
ordinary income.
(iv) There are no restrictionson interest deduction18.
(v) Capital gains are taxedat lower rates than ordinary income.
(vi)Long—termcapital gains are taxed at lowerrates than short ten.
1.1
of Postponed RealizationWe now establish
ProjtjonlIfcapital markets are perfect (satisfyconditions (1) —(3)and
the tax system satisfiesConditions (I) —(iii),thenwith rational investorspursuing
an extreme 'Tlocked in"strategy (buthedgingthe associated risk) the taxsystem
leavesunaffected iiidividnja1;'consumptionand bequestsineachstate of nature and—4—
5
raises no revenue.
Assumethe individual has taxable wage income attime t f We show how
withonly onerisky securitythe individual may manage his portfolio insuch a way
as tc eliminate all tax liabilities.For simplicity, we use discrete time,withthe
periodof analysis correspondingto that for the payment of taxes (a year).We
denote with an asterick values of variablesin the no—tax situation, and with a caret
the values in the tax avoidance portfolio strategy.
We assume at the beginning of the periodhe has outstanding debts of Bt and
outstanding holdings of the risky assetof At.(If there are many risky assets,
then At is to be treated as a vector.) We assumethe rate of interest for the
period is and that all debt is short term. For simplicity, assume B0
=0,
A0
=0.Assume the individual would have had an optimalinvestment strategy in the
absence of taxation denoted by {A(S) ,B(S)
}whereS
denotes the "state" of
nature at time t
(a complete description of the historyof the economy up to that date).






wherePt isthe price of the asset in theth period. For simplicity, we have
assumed risky assets pay nodividends.6 (The modifications required if firms pay
dividends are straightforward.)
Assume that with probability one
p(S) pi(Si) for all {S, Si}
and, for simplicity, we assume that
mm - =(Si)
> 0.
Assume the first period the individual sets
MS0) A(S0) +y1/9
butsimultaneously sells short y1I91unitsof theasset, so the net position—5—
remains A .Then,at the end of the period, the individual
will have made a loss
either on the asset or on the shortsales. Ifp1 >p0,he closes out the short
salefor a net loss of
(P1 —PU)y1
so he will have no taxliability, lie then again sells shorty1/ unitsofthe
asset, so he again carries forwards anet position of A.
He thenpurchases an additional amount
A3 -A+2,
12
sellingshort an additioial amount 8
Following thesameprocedure as the
12 previousperiod, he then more than eliminates all
the tax liabilities he has accrued
that period,
The process continues untilat death, all shares are realized.Since all gains
are assumed to escape taxation
upon death, this procedure has enabled the individual
to avoid completely all income andcapital taxation, and to leave hisconsumption and
bequests identical to what they wouldhave been (in every state ofnature) in the
absence of taxation, (Theprocedure we have outlined is, ofcourse, not the only
procedure that would have worked; inparticular, it is not the procedure which minimizes
the number of transactions,sjnce
no account is taken of the previouspositions taken,
and the prices at which thesecurities were purchased at earlierdates.)
1.2 An Alternative Pro cedur forAvoiding Taxation: The Optfmalityof Immediate
Realization
Inthis section,we show how there is an equally effectiveway of avoiding
taxationwhen there is a differentialtax rate on long and short termgains and
losses. We assume the capital market is perfect (inthe sense defined above);
but now, we assume the taxsystem has the additional criticalpropertythat long—
term gains are taxed at z timesthe rate on short—term gains.
Throughout the analysis, eassume a "flexible" timeperiod: the individualcan
realize a gain or loss just L or after the end of the period, thusrecording—6—
either a short term loss or a long term gain.
Weemploy exactly the same model and notation asin the previous subsection. We
assumethat the individual tkos precisely the same investmentdecisions as inthe
previous madelat theendof theO period. AL the end ofthe first period, if
thereis a decline in price, the individual rclizes the loss, just ashe did earlier.
But now he sells his entire long" position. This impliesthat during the first period,
the individual will have no tax liability, and willhave a tax loss carry over of
Tp0-p1){A+j _y
(where Tisthe tax rate)
At the beginning of the next period, he closes outhis short position, incurring
a long—term tax liability of
(p0 -p1)zil.
Hisnet tax liability at that juncture is
o - - l)y1/1-AI
Ifz is small, L1 will frequently benegativcJ0
Similarly, if there is a rise inpricehe closes out his short positionjust
shortof a year, eliminating histax liability and establishing a lOSS ccrryforward of
\Yl — — P0iiY1
Atthe beginning of the next period, he closes outhis long position, incurring a
longtermtaxliability of
—p0)[A+ l]
Now,his net liability on the capital account is
L1 {(p-p0)((z
—1)Y1+ zA)+




andselling short y2÷L1' units of therisky asset.Thisensures that at the end
of the period, he will have sufficientlosses not only to eliminateany outstanding
taxliability on capital account, hut also to eliminateany tax liability on his wage
income.
The procedurecontinues, until
liabilitiesare escaped. Note that
stale is the same as it was without
each state was identjcal to what it
We have thus established
Proposition2. Withperfect capitalmarkets (satisfying conditions (1) —(3))and a
tax system satisfying conditions (i)—(iii)and (vi), then, with rationalinvestors,
realizing all losses as soon as theyoccur, and all gains as soon as they become
eligible for long term treatment,accompanied by the appropriate hedgingstrategy,
consumption and bequests of the individual inevery state of nature willbe the same
asit would be without taxation and thetax system raises no revenues.
1.3 A Third Procedure for the Avoidanceof Taxation: The Optimality of Indebtedness
There is another procedure for the avoidance of taxation,
if there is an asset yieldinga sure capital gain at the rate r*, if interestis
deductible. For the individualsimply borrows
at date t—1,so that his interest the t period is
yt r1
He will thus have no taxliability. With the proceeds, he purchases theasset yielding
the sure capital gain,postponing the realization of the capital gain untildeath, at
which point he repays the debt.U Notethat if the individual uses the assetas a
collateral for the loan, the lender incursno risk in the transaction.
the individual dies, in whichcase any outstanding
again, in this procedure, consumption in each
taxation,and the individual's net position in
wouldhave been without taxation.—8—
This, again, s onl one of several possible waysto avoid taxation. If there
is favorable treatment of long termgains,the individual could just as well have
avoidedtaxes by realizing his capital gain as soon asitbecomes eligible for long
termtreatment. Then he will have a tax liability onthe gain of (assume r=r*, all t)
z .r—4-
=
Hethen borrows enough to offset this as well ashis wage income next period.
The tth period, the individualts indebtednesswill be
t—l
E y.zt-i
Similarresults obtain if there is some asset whoseminimal return is positive.
Assume Pt't—l >' andassume the individual sells an option to buythe security at
price t—1'
at a price Withthe proceeds of this and a loan of a dollars,
he purchases shares of the security. His net positionat the end of the period is
(a+1- {
- — (1+r)a,wherep is therealization of Pt.




Then,if the option can be held long enough to be eligiblefor long term treatment,
the individual can use the deductibility of interestto offset all of his tax liabilities.
We summarize the results of this subsectionin
Proposition3a. If there is a perfect capitalmarket (conditions (1) to (3) are
satisfied) ,andthe tax system satisfies assumptions (i) to (iv)and, in addition,
there exists an asset yielding a perfectly safe capital.gain, then there exists an
optimal investment strategy with individualsborrowing to invest the safe asset,
and postponing ie realization of capital gainsuntil death. . isinvestment—9--
strategy, consumption and bequests are identicalto what they would be inevery state
of nature in the absence oftaxation, and no revenue is collectedby the tax.'2
Proposition 3h. [Judr theconditions of Proposition 3a, ifin addition, there is
favorabletreatmentof long te capital gains (taxcondition (v)), then there exists
an optimal investmentstrategy with individuals borrowingto invest inthe safe asset,
and realizing capitalgains on the safe asset as soonas they become eligible for
long term treatment, which leaves
consumption andquests unchanged and thetax raises
no revenue.
Proposition JcAssume theConditions ofPropoSJtion 3a, except now, assume (a)
thereexistsno safe asset, but there existsa risky asset with a minimal positive
return; and (b) there exists anoptions market for the asset (withzero transactions
costs),with a maturity of oneyear (So it is eligible for long termtreatment if
held to maturity). Then, thereexists an optimal investmentstrategy with individuals
borrowing, selling options, andbuying the security with minimalpositive return.
This investment strategy leaves
consumptiond bequests unchanged and thetax raises no
revenue.
1.4 The Optima lity ofRo11-OversStrj
The fourth strategy foravoiding taxation is similar to thesecond, with one
major difference. It does notrequire that there by any advantageoustreatment of
long term capital gains. All thatis required is that gains andlosses be taxed only
upon realization (what we identifiedas one of the distinctive properties of
capital
gains taxation).
The individual buys and sellsshort a sufficient amount of therisky asset, so
that, with probabilityone, at the end of theyear, he has a loss onone side of the
transaction large enough to offset hisother sources of income, i.e. hesets
=
A(S0)+
Atthe end of the year, he realizesthatpartof the transaction on which he has—10--
made a loss, e.g. if P1P0, he sells the security,recording a loss of
p1)y1R1y1




At the beginning of the next period, he closes outhis position, so that at the
beginning of the year, he has an accrued taxliability of -ry1 (where Tisthe
taxrate). The next year, hebuys and sells short enough of the securityto enable
himto offset both his income and his accrued taxliability; he purchases
A1(S1) =A(S1)+(y1 + y2)R2
of the asset, while selling short
(y1+ y2)/2,
sohis net speculative position is unchanged. The process repeatsitself, so that
in the tth year, he sets
t+l
A(St) =A(S)+ .y/i 1=1
and sells short an amount
t+l
of the asset.
This process thus enables him to postpone allof his tax liabilities until
death. We thus have established
Proposition4. With a perfect capital market (satisfying.properties (1) —(3))and
a tax system satisfying properties (i) —(iii),then the roll—over strategy is
optimal. Individuals are able by usingthis strategy to avoid all taxation, andtheir
consumption in each state of nature isunaffected by the tax.
2. Avoiding Tax Restrictions
Inthe previous analysis, we made two important,and unrealistic, assumptions
concerning the tax code: we assumed that there were norestrictions on wash sales and
full loss offsets. In this section, we show how theserestrictions ma be avoided.—11--
2.1 Perfect_Capital_NarketithRcstrictionssiies
In this section, we show that therestrictions on wash sales need not bebinding.
It is widely believed that bybuying a sufficicnt]y large number ofrandomly Chosen
securities, one can obtain aportfolio(it is often argued that only 25are in fact
required) which is virtually perfectlycorrelated with the marketa whale. This
is an implication of both thecapital asset pr:Lcing model and thearbitrage model.
If this assumption is not true, thenthe capital markets cannot beperfectly competitive
(and the market equilibrium willnot, in general, be Pareto optimal. SeeStiglitz
(1981).) We shall refer to acapital market which satisfies, in additionto condition
(1) to (3), conditcn (4) below
(4) There are at least toassets (or portfolios of assets) withperfectly
correlated returns.
We asse that the restrictionson wash sales take the fori that the ndivldual
cannot simultaneously (or within a hortLime span ——heretaken to be the next
period) purchase and sell the same.asset. We focus our discussion on ProposI Lion2,
where the individual does this to takeadvantage of the favcrable treatment oflong—
term gai ns. Now instead of selling shorty1/2.1 units of asset "e he sells short
y1/11units of asset ''.'Ifp1 > p0, at the end ofthe period, he realizesthe loss
on his tgUposition,and at the beginning of the nextperiod (as soon as the asset
becomes eligible for long termtreatment) he sells his +y1/11units of 'ta".
He then goes "long" in in the amount andshort in a •inthe amount
y2fL1.Theprocedure contimmes as before; eachperiod the individual "reverses"
hi2.
More generally, we can establish
posftion5.With a perfect capital market,satisfying conditions (1)(4), tax
restrictions on wash sales need never bebinding; any consumption—bequest plan which
could be achieved in the absence of theprovsjons relating to the tax treatment of—12—
wash sales can be achieved witb the wash sale provisions;in particular gains are realized
as soonas they become eligible for long—term treatment.
Thereexist portfolio policies
implementing the tax avoidance strategies described by propositionsl-4 in which
the provisions relating to the tax treatment of wash sales areirrelevant)3
2.2 RestrictIons on Loss Offsets
In the previous analysis we allowed the individual to use capitallosses to
offset ordinary income. In fact, of course, only $3,000of capital losses can be used
within any year to offset ordinary income. If Lhis constraint werean important one,
oneshould observe most individuals operating against it.There arc. however, a
varietyof ways by which theimpact of this constraint may be reduced.
Thesimplest method entails taking advantage of thedeductibility of interest
payments, by borrowing, and purchasing asale asset which yields its returns in the
form of capital gains.
Evenif theredoes not exist a perfectly safe asset, the individual canobtain
equivalent results if there exists a security with aminimal positive capital gain,
by selling an option on the security, asdescribed in section 1.3. Alternatively,
the individual can "lend" money to thestock marketthroughthe options market•attain-
ing asafe return in the form of capital gains. To do this, assumethe current price
of the asset is p. The individual buys one unit of the security,buys a put for
with a striking price exceeding the current price (so his teturnnext period is
"s'°,
—+land sells an optIon for q0 with the; same striking price, so
hiareturn next period is mm [0, '
— Thushis net income next period is
justp3,and in equilibrium.
p5
—(14 r*)[p + c—ci0]
where r* is the safe rate of interest. Sincehis return is perfectly safe, it must
be equal to the safe rate.of interest.—13—
There are, however, alternativemethods which arecommonly employed. An
individual can purchasean asset with borrowed funds forwhich the depreciatjo
allowanceexceed the true economic depreciatjo•If the dcpreciat:jon allowances
plus interest on the loan exceedthe flow of quasi—rents fromthe asset, then there
will be an ordinary incomeloss, with a subsequent capitalgain.
An individual can sell shorta security shortly beforea dividend is due.
Followingthe paent of thedividend, thepriceof the security willdecline, and
hewill experience a capitalgain; this is offset by the dividendpayment which he
must make, but the latter is
deductible against ordinaryincome. (See Allen, 1982)
The 1981 tax law imposed
restrictions on several of the devicesfor converting
capital losses into ordinary income
losses, and thereby evading therestrictions on
loss offsets. These include
taking advantage of the provisionsrelated to the tax
treatment of Treasury Bills, Cashand Carry Transactions, andthe tax treatment of
traders.
2.3i cations ofWash Saleandlo__O p
The restrictions on wash salesand loss offsets areParticularly important for
theinvestment strategywhichwe have called that of ImmediateRealization. But the
restriction on wash sales also hasimplications for the firststrategy, that which
we have referred to as the
postponement strategy. For if individualsare to postpone
their tax liability, withoutat the same time increasing theirposition in the security
beyond the desired level, then theindividual must hedge hisposition (e.g. by selling
the security short). But ifhe does this within a
year of purchase, although hemay
be able to postpone the
tax, the transaction will not beeligible for long—terpi
treatment.
If the restrictionsimply that the individual cannot
use the special treatment of
capital gains to reduce the tax
liability on ordinary income (bymore than the $3,000
loss offset plus the intereston the amount which the individualcan borrow) he can
still ue these provisions
to eliminate any tax liabilityon his capital income.—14—
2.4 Further Comnents on the Implicationsof Special_Provisions
There are several other special provisionsof the tax code relating to thetreat-
ment ofc'pita1 :incc,mewhichimpingeon individual's ability to implementthetax
avoidance strategies described earlier.
Wereferred,for instance, to the provisions concerningthe treatment of short
term capital losses in the presenseof long tent capital gains. The methodswhich
we descri bed above of convertingordinary income into short term capital gains.
toavoid the limitations on the deductahilitYof losses, may be used to vitiate the
effects of these provisions as well.
The provisions restricting the amount
of interest which can be deducted are
relevant for the indebtedness strategy described in Proposition3. Empirically, this
restriction does not seem to he binding (See Feenberg1981) which suggests that there
are easy ways by which the restrictioncan be avoided, e.g. taking advantageof the
peculiarities in the definition of thosekinds of investment income which can beused
to increase the amount of interestwhich can be deducted and/or that the presenttax
code provides alternative and equallyeffective ways by which taxes can be avoided
(as our analysis has already suggested ).
Someof the special provisions of the tax codemake tax avoidance easier. For
instance, if a bond were sold below par, the increasein the value of the
bond between the purchase date and the maturitydate is not treated as a capital
gain, but as interest income (closingwhat would be an obvious tax avoidancescheme.) Prior
to 1982 a T year bond,1/T of the capital gainns imputed as incometo the owner of bond
and l/T Was deductible as an interest expense bythe seller. For simplicity, assume
the interest rate is fixed. In the absenceof taxation, an individual or firm which
sold a T period zero coupon bond, and used the proceedsto buy a T period coupon bond,
investing the interest payments at the samesafe rate of interest, was able at
the end of T periods with the proceeds to pay
off the holders of the zero coupon bonds.—15—
He would be indifferent toundertaking the transaction. Withtaxation, however, there
is every year a tax reduction in theamount of14
Tfi-e rTerT}
T
which he can use to offset eitherordinary or capital income)5
Here, as elsewhere, we have ignored thegeneral equilibrium aspects of tax
avoidance ; the arithmetic imputation schemeincreases the tax liability of
the individual purchasing the bond.If there was no taxexempt Institutions or
individuals facing a zero marginaltaxrate,this should be reflected in theprice
which a buyer is willing topay for such a bond. So long, however,as there are tax
exempt institutions, they should be willing tobuy the zero coupon bonds and seil
the coupon bonds; in equilibriumsone dollar T period zerocoupon bond should —rT sell for e
Part II
3. Imperfect Capital Markets
The analysis of Part Imade the kinds of "perfect market"assumptions
conventional in the finance literature, andthe simplifications in the tax code that
we employed inouranalysis were again of the kind that arefrequently found, both
in textbook expositions and inanalytical discussions in the public financeliterature.
Yet the results which
emerge were clearly unrealistic: individuals dopay taxes, and
the taxes surely do affect both thereal investment decisions andconsumption decisions
of individuals.
Thus, an analysis of the impact of thecapital gains tax must focus on the
imperfections of the capital market andon at least some of the detailed provisions of
the tax code.
In the previous section, we showedhow those provisions of the tax codewhich,
It is commonly argued, restrictindividuals'abiljtjes to avoid taxes in theway that
we described inpropositions 1—4would not, in a perfectly competitivecapital market,—16—
be binding. More generally, it is our contention that evenif the detailed provisions
of the tax code put some limits on the extent towhich individuals can avoid taxes,
if investors were rational and if capital markets were perfect,there would be much
morctax avoidance than is presently observed. Thus,the remainder of this paper is
devoted to the analysis of the consequences of capital gainstaxation with imperfect
capital markets.
Notsurprisingly, the consequences depend critically on preciselywhat constraints
are binding, e.g. whether there is a borrowingconstraint or a short sale constraint.
Althoughthe four policies we outlined in the previous section areall equivalent in
a perfect market ——theyall succeed in eliminating all tax liabilities —--theyinvolve
quitedifferent transactions (and transactions costs). For instance,the policy of
postponed realization (the locked in strategy) may requirelarge amounts of short sales,
and, under present institutional arrangements (where ashort sale is not just the
negative of a purchase) this may entail significantamounts of borrowing. Similarly,
the roll—over strategy requires increasing amounts ofshort sales over time. Borrowing
constraints are obviously critical for the third strategy.In contrast, borrowing
is not so critical for the policy of iimnediate realization.Limitations on loss
offsets are, however, critical for this strategy, aswell as for the policy of post-
poned realization and the roll—over strategy.In the subsequent section, we
detail the effects of capital gains taxation under a varietyof imperfect capital
market conditions.
4. The Basic Intertemporal Trade—offs in the Timing of al Gains
The central feature of the capital gains tax upon which wefocus is that investors
can time their realization of gains and losses,and by doing so affect their tax
liabilities. We shall show that paying careful attention tothis aspect of investment
strategy may, in fact, yield far higher after—taxreturns than paying a corresponding
amount of attention to the choice of alternative assets (particularlyif one believes
in the random walk hypothesis).—17--
When an individual decidesto realize a gain today ratherthan at some later date,
he affects not only his taxliability today, but also his taxliability at that later
date. Thus, the impact o.f thecapital gains tax can only beassessed within an
intertemporal model. There are threebasic effects, which we referto as the rate
effect,thePDV effect, and the risk effect.
(a) TheRatefeetThe timing of the realjzatiojof a gain or loss affects
thetax rate which is imposed:16
(1) by postponingrealization, a short—tcrn gainmay be converted into a
long—term gain; or Conversely.
(ii) by realizing a lossearly, it may be treated as shortterm, rather than
long term.
(iii)by Postponing realizatioi untildeath, the capital gains taxmay be
avoided entirely.
(iv) Consider an asset purchasedat t0 Assume that the individual
realizes a loss at date
t1 ,andreinvests the proceeds in a similar
asset. Assume at
t2anevent occurs which necessitates that
individual selling his asset. If1 + t0<t2
<1+ t1,thenthis
change in value between
t1 and t2 is treated as short term, while
if the individual had notrealized his loss at
t1 ,itwould have
been treated as long term. Ifthere is a large gain betweent1 and
t2 ,theindividual is worse off; if thereis a loss, he is better
off. This argumentassumes an imperfect capital market;as we argue
below, if the individual could borrowor sell short an essentially
equivalent security, then he wouldnot need to sell his asset, even
if a contingency arose whichrequired the expenditure of a significant
fraction of his net worth. 17
(v) The realization ofa large capital gain in oneparticular year may
result (because of theprogressivity of the tax structureand the—1 8—
imperfectprovisions for averaging) in theindividual facing a heavier
tax liabilitythan if the asset were sold gradually over a numberof
years. At the same time, theability to timethe realization of capital
gainsand losses may enhance the effective degree of averagingassociated
with the income taxstructure.1
Equally important, if the individual has arealized (short term or long term)
loss exceedingthelimitations on loss offsets, then the effective currentmarginal
taxrateon any realized gains is zero.
(b)The PDV effect
By postponing the realization of a gain,the present discounted value of the
tax, liability on the gain is reduced (ifthe rate of interest is positive); conversely,
by realizing a loss as soon as it occurs,the present discounted value of the implicit
taxreductionis increased.
Conversely,if there were no inflation, but therealrate of interest were
negative, the individual would lower his taxliability by realizing gains as soon
asthey occur and postponing tax losses. Effectively,the government borrows money
paying a zero rate of interest, while allother borrowers pay negative interest rates,
and hence the individualprefers to lend to thegovernmentby realizing only gains and
postponingall losses.
(c)Risk Effects
Therealization of a gain this year may make it possiblefor the individual to
realize a loss next period which the individual otherwisewould not be able to realize.
Of course, if the individual were sure that the assetwere going to decrease in value,
then he would clearly not keep the asset (in the absenceof taxation). But if there
is some chance that it will decrease in value, andif there is differential treatment
of long term gainsand short termlossesit may pay the individual to realize the
gaintoday. Assume, for instance, that the individual purchasedan asset at a price—19—
p0 ,andits present price isp1 .Assumethere is some probability that the
price will fall back top0 and some probability that it will rise to p2 .By
realizingthe ga.[ntoday, the individual increases his tax liabiU ty by
zr (p1—p0)
whei:eZ-ris the tax on long term capital gains. If theprice falls to p0 his
tax liability next period will be reducedT(p1—p0) ,whereT is the tax on short
term capital gains. If the price rises, assume he sellsthe asset at some date t
periods later, the same as lie had planned to do originally. Weassume this date is
sufficiently far in the future that any gain will beeligible for treatment as long
term. His tax liabilityat thisdate is increased by zT(p1—p0).Thechange in the
expected present discountedvalue of his taxliability is
IF (l—r)z T(p1-p0) [z-(-—+
]
(l+r)
whereiisthe probability of the pricefalling, and r is the interest rate.
Notethat if r =0,butz <1,thepolicy of immediate realization has a lower
PDV, while if z =1and r >0,thepolicy of postponed realization has a lower
PDV.
The individual is effectively givingmoney to the government at date t —I
for the "right" to obtainmoney from it at date t ,ifthe price of the security
goes down.
This way of putting the problem makes it clearthat the right to realize a
short term loss and receive an offset against otherincome is like a put: the
value of the option increases the lower the price of thesecurity and is greater the
greater is T .Moreover,the put "expires" in a year. The price paid for the
option is the increase in tax liability, at datet —1,fromrealizing the capital
gain. It is lower the lower is z and higher the higher is theprice relative to
the original purchase price. Finally, since theloss will occur in the future, while
he has to pay for the right to take the losstoday, the value of this option depends
on the rate of discount.—20—
This risk effect will play an important role in our subsequent analysis. If
individuals are risk averse, this effect, arising out of thestochasticnature of
assets, is even greater.
4.1 Risk Aversion
The PDV effect, which we discussed earlier, reflects the fact that a dollar
todayis not equivalent to a dollar tomorrow. Present dollars are worth morethan
futuredollars.In addition, income in some events (states of nature) may be worth
more than income in other event:s (states of nature). If there were perfect insurance
markets, thentheindividual would have equated the marginal utility of income in
19 Butthere are not perfect insurance markets, and hence the marginal all states.
utilityof income in some states mayexceed that in others, Thus, let us return
to our example of an individual who has an asset which has increased in value from
p0 to p1 .Thereis some chance that next year will be a recession in which case
his wage will be lower (but not sufficiently lower to reduce his marginal tax bracket).
Theindividual would like to insure against this event, but cannot obtain insurance
in the market. He may, however, be able to obtain some insurance through the tax
system. Assume that if there is a recession the price will fall back to p0 .We
notedearlier that by realizing the gain today, he increases his current tax liability
by r(p1 —p0)
.Butthen, if the recession occurs, he will be able to reduce his
tax liability by T(p1 —p0).
If the marginal utility of income in the recession is
sufficiently high, he will be willing to purchase this "insurance" even though the
expected present discounted value of his tax liabilities is thereby increased.2021
The mathematical models that we present in the subsequent sections
help to clarify the nature of the important intertemporal trade—offs that we
have identified in this section.
5, Optimal_Investme_yor aShort-Term Investor
In this section weanalyzetheoptimalinvestment strategy for a short—term
investor. We assume that he knows that at theendof, say, two periods, he will—21--
wish to cash in his investments. His
objective then is simply to maximize theexpected
value of his terminal wealth at theend of two periods. His initialwealth is W
Theprobability distribution of thepercentageincrease in the price of theasset
isgiven by F(p/p1) and is thesame for all t. Wechoose our units so that
initially the individual has one unit ofwealth, and purchases one unit of theasset,
withp =1.Atthe end of the first period, theasset is worth
p1
.Theindividual
caneither sell his asset,
repurchasiig an identical asst, paying outor receiving
fromthe governnent a capitalgains tax (short— or long—term, as theindividualtimes
hissales on the 365th or 366th day);or he can retain his asset. The secondperiod,
the individual willsellhis asset. If he retained hisassetthe preceding period, itwill be subjected to long—term
taxation; otherwise, it will be subjected tolong—
term or short—term taxation at theindividual's discretion. Straightfocalculations
establish that
Proposition_6Thereexistsarcai , suchthat
for p-< p the individualsells his asset while forp >pthe individual retains
his asset.




F(l)=fractionof time that a lossoccurs,
g .I(p —l)dF/(l-F(l))=percentagemean value of a gain, 1
conditional on a gain Occurring.
and
yis the averagerate of return onthe asset.
From this, we can easilycalculate the fraction of the timethat individuals do
not turn over their securitiesat the end of the year, F()
.Itis clear what p
depends on:
(1) If 1, i.e. fulltxaLion olcapital gains, then p1, the individual—22—
realizes all losses, but postpones all gains.
As z3, p-
(2)if =0,the individual realizes all losses as short term,and all gains
assoon as they become eligiblefor long—term treatment. The reason for
thisis that, in this model, funds arereinvested in the same asset. Hence,
the effective discount rate is zero andthere is no advantage to postponing
capital gains.
(3) Thelargerthe mean return, the smaller ,whilethe larger the expected
value of the loss, conditional c:-n a loss occurring,the larger p. Moreover,
the smaller z, the larger the advantages-tobe had from the asymmetric
treatment of gains and losses,and therefore thelarger.
6.Long—Term Investors
Similarconditions can he used to show that long terminvestors too may find it
optimal to realize their capital gains as soonas they become eligible for long term
treatment. The analysis is, however,considerably more complicated. We focus onthe
case where the stochastic process describingthe asset's price isstationary2
Assume we buy an asset at p =1,and let the minimum holding period for long—term
treatment be one period. (These are just
norma1izatior.) There is a constant
probability 1 >0that the individualwill have to realize the asset at date
23
Then the optimal policy may be simply described asfollows:
There is a critical price p(t) such thatif p(t) <p(t)the loss should be
realized. The costs of realization at date t are(i) there is a chance that
in the interval (1, 1 + t), there will be a"forced" realization, which will be
treated as short term, which, otherwise, wouldbe treated as long term; and (ii)
to take advantage of a tax loss at a subsequentdate, the price must fall still further.
Earlier, we suggested that one couldthink of the right to obtain a tax loss as
a put, with a fixed termination dateof a year. But unlike conventional puts,whenever
the put is exercised, it is replaced by a new put,somewhat less attractive inits—23—
striking price than the original put but witha longer maturity. The benefit
(if p < 1), is the tax rebate.
Consider first the case where theprobability of a forced realization is
zero. Clearly, p > 1 for 0 < t<1. For if the price ever returnsto its original
level, the individual can replace the "old"putwitha new put, at no cost. The return
from doing so increases with t.Theold put and the new putsareidentical, at
t=0,and hence there is no benefit toreplacing one with the other. Hence, (O) =1.
This result maybeseen in a slightly different way. Assume att=1,
(t)=1,i.e. the investor always retainsassets on which he has earned a long—term
capital gain. Assime the individual willnot sell the asset (for consumptionpurposes)
for an extended period of time (morethan a year). Then, there is a finiteprobability
within a year if p is near unity thatthe price will become less thanunity (as p
approaches unity, this probability increases.)If p does become less thanunity,
there is a finite gain to being ina position to realize the loss as a short—term
loss. Since as p -*1,the cost of being in this positiongoes to zero, it is clear
that must exceed one.
With forced realizations, we needto ask, would an individual be willingto pay
a positive price for a contract whichgave the individual an additional amount of
—ifPt < p1, but where he would have to pay an additional amount of
T(p —
p1)(l—z) if Pt > p1. if he sells the asset within a year, knowing that there
is some probability that he willinvoluntarily have to sell the asset during that
interval. From what we said earlier, if
the probability is zero, the price ofthis
contract is positive; while if theprobability is large enough, the probability of
a gain is significant enough, andz is small enough, then the price of contract
is negative. We shall limitourselves to the case where the probabilit- a forced
realization is sufficiently small that theprice of this contract is pos ive.
There is a discontinuity in at t=1.Once the asset has become longterm,
the price paid for realization ismuch reduced; and given ourstationarity assumptions,—24—
aftert =1,both thebeflefitsand costs remain unchanged.
Finally, we note the effect of thedifferential taxes on long—term and short—
term gains on .Iflong—term andshort—termgains are taxed at the samerate,
forail t
For assume (t) >1.The only reason that we argued that thereis an advantage to
realizing a gain was that it put us in a positionto realize a short—term loss. Assume
that subsequently at t we realized a lossof —p.If wehad simply waited until
p,the PDV of our tax liabilities would havebeen T(p
—l)ertrather than
—rt —rt —l)e + (p —p)e].Conver;ely,ifp(t) <1.
Consider now the other limiting case, where z=0,i.e. there is no long—term
capital gains tax. Then, just after t=1,the individual wouldrealizehis gain;
thereis no cost to obtaining the "put" and (under ourassumptions,, if the rate of
forcedrealizations islow enough) considerable benefit:. ltimmediately follows that,
24
once again,p(t) =1for 0 <t<1.
We can summarize this discussion in
There is a critical (t)suchthat if p(t) <p(t),the individual
sells his asset. satisfies the following propertieS
(a) p(0)=l
(b) p'(t) >0 for t> 1
(c) urn i(t)< Urnp(t)>l
tAl.tl








Although in this and the precedingsection we have analyzed the optimalinvestment—25—
strategy of an investor under rather particulasassumptions, elsewhere we haveexplored
alternative formulations. The result that,provided the capital gain is not toolarge,
it is desirableto realize gains as soonas they become eligible for long termtreat—
25,26,27 ment, appears to be robust.
Part III
The Welfare Analysis of Capital GainsTaxation
7. Exchans Efficiency, ProductionEfficiency, and the Locked in Effect
Therehas been considerableconcern over the Pistortionaryeffects of capital
gainstaxation, in particular, over the locked in effect. Theanalysis of the preceding
sect ioos has raised two importantpoints: ina perfect capital market, there are no
realconsequemeesof capital gains taxation; while inan imperfect capital market,
there may or may not be a locked in effect.The fact that distortionary effects
only occur in markets with some capital market
imperfection makes any welfare analysis
tenuous: we cannot rely on the Fundamental Theoremof Welfare economics tosay that
in the absence of taxation, the marketequilibruin would have been pareto optimal (rae
Stiglitz (1981)). What is required is a second bestanalysis, which would take us beyond
the scope of this paper. Wecan, however, attempt to identify the kinds of distortions
introduced by the capital gains tax, inparticular, those arising from the locked in
effect, when it occurs. The locked in effect hastwo consequences:
(a) The ecoy_l], no longer have, thepropertyof "exchange" efficienc1.
There are transfers of ownership ofassets which could make both parties to the
transfer better off, which, because of thetax,willnot take place. There is
some question, however, concerning the magnitude of theassociated welfare loss.
In particular, the importance thatone ascribes to the locked in effeat on the
stock market depends on one's view of the role ofthe stock market in allocating
real resources (as opposed to providinga convenient gambling casino for wealthy
individuals). (See Stiglitz (1982)).—26—
(b) The capital gains tax interferes with the"PrOdUCtiVe" efficiencyof the economI.
There are at least three ways that capital gains taxation mayinterfere with the
productive efficiency of the economy. First, thereis a widespread belief that the
locked in effect gives rise to greater volatility of asset prices, and this greater price
volatility makes investments in equities less attractive. Secondly,in those situations
where ownership of assets affects the uses to which they are put,the impediments to
the transfer of ownership of assets to those who can best managethem may result in
significant productive losses to theeconomy.28 Thirdly, when the return to an
investment project is realized in the form of a capital gain,then the date of
termination of the project affects the present value of the tax liability,and hence
the project may be terminated at a date different from when itwould have otherwise
have been terminated.
In the following sections, we construct simple models examining some aspectsof
these distortions associated with capital gains taxation.
8. The Locked in Effect and Price Instabiliy
In the preceding section, we noted that there was a widespreadbelief that because
the locked in effect results in thinner markets, prices are likelyto be more volatile.
To assess this allegation, one needs to construct a general equilibriummodel. It
is not, for instance, obvious that thinner marketsresult in greater price volatility;
the locked in effect might reduce the supply of assetsand the demand for it proportion-
ately (owners of firm A are "locked in" and sodo not offer it for sale; but owners
of other firms are also "locked in" and so do not offer tobuy.) 2
The present section provides the simplest dynamic general equilibriummodel,
which shows that the capital gains tax may indeedresult in greater pricevolatilitY.30
We also show that it may result in exchanges whichotherwise would have occurred not
occurring (but it may not necessarily do so.)
There are two groups in the population, two statesof nature, one risky security
to be traded, and no short sales. In state 0,the dividend is ,instate 1 it is—27--
.Weleta. and .denotetheaftertax dividends receivedby group i .cn theeCofleayis in state0 the probability thatit will be in state 0next period
inthe judgement of indivdua3sof type i is Similarly when it s in stateJ,
the Probability thatitwill he in state 1 nextperiod is The co groupsmay differ in their judgmentsabeut the transitionprohabjlitie5 (equivalently sincewhat
we will be interested in isthe marginal utility ofincome in each state times the
probabilitythat product will differbetween the two groupseven when,with rational
expectations theyagreeonthe transitionprobabilities)
In each state, thesecurity will be held by thegroup which valuesit most
highly.The valuation of thesecuritydepends, of course, on whattheybelievethey
can sell the security for, ifthey desired to sell it. Forsimplicity, we shall
focus on the case wheregroup A holds the security instate0, group B holds the
31 security in state 1.
Then
(8.1)
V06IxA[CA + V0] + (1 —rA)[A+V1 —zTA(Vl
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value of security in state I
= discount factor
z = ratio of capital gainstaxtotaxonordinary income
tax on ordinary income ofgroup i
A -B
x00, 1 71B -
Solving(8.1) and (8.2)simultaneously, we obtain
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From this, we can easily calculate the effectof any change of taxation on price
volatility. We examine one special case, leavingother cases to the reader. We
assume that the probability of a transitionfrom state 0 to 1 is equal to the probability
of a transition from state 1 to state O in the judgmentof the individual holding the
security (which differs in the two states). We assume moreoverthat TA =TB•
Hence








From(8.4) V0/V11 as 0; hence an increase in the capital gains tax
thcreass volatility if and only if ct1 >
Wecan also use this model to showthat the capital gains tax may result in
exchanges which would have taken placein the absence of capital gains taxation not
occurring. To see this, we recall that for(8.1) and (8.2) to describe the equilibrium,
the valuation of the risky security in state 0 mustbe higher for group A than
for group B. Assume individual B initially ownsthe shares. We can calculate—29—
howmuch he receives, after payingcapital gains tax, if he sells. (at Awill
be willing to pay depends,as we have already noted, on how much taxA will have to
pay when, subsequently, he resells back to B).Siuilarlv,we can calcuiate hc much
it is worth to B to retain theasset permanently. If the capitalgains tax rate
is high enough, the latter isgreater than the foiirer and no transactionoccurs.
There is, as we have noted,some debate about the welfare significanoe of the
reduced trading and increasedprice volatility in the stock market. Ifthe stock
market is not hing more than a rich man'sgambling casino, then perhaps one shouldnot
be too concerned. On the otherhand, if ownership and control arelin1ed, tbe locked
in effect may result in theasset being ownecl—nd thuscontrolled——by an individual,
when some other individual would beable to put the asset to betteruse.
9.Real Investments and Capital GainsTaxation
In this section, we focus on the realeffects of capital gains xation:
the impact ithas on thekinds of investment projects 'ndertakcn. this,we
employthestandard Austrian capital model; inStiglirz (1981) I show t (i) there
was some tendency for projects to beterminated too early, not too 1 nd(ii) if
onecould not inferunambiguously from observed average returns what marginal
returnswere, then there was no method of constructiverealization wi ch was pn—
distortionary.
Here,I wish both to gereralize and tOqualify thisfirstresult: to show that
thereis a general class of problems for which
the techniques employed therecan be
used to show that the first result is valid,
but, at the same time, that there are other
important classes of problems for which the"conventional" wisdom, thatprojects
will be terminated too late, istrue.
We assume an investment of a dollaryields, after a period of T years, areturn
of f(T). The question posedis, at what date (or for whatsizetttree1) should
the project be terminated. While inthe portfolio mode)s considered inearlier
sections,we assumed the (expected) perc:cntagereturn wasconstant over time (although—30—
this was not essential for some of the results), here we assume thatthere is
diminishing returns.
The impact of taxation will, be shown to dependontwo critical factors: (1)
whetherthe project is treated in isolation, or is one ofa sequence of related
projects;e.g. if, whetherwhen thetree is cut down, it will be repaced by another
tree; and (2)theextent to whichtherate of discount (after tax) isaffectedby the
capital gains tax (i.e. the extent to which there is effective shiftingof the capital gai--
tax).
9.1 Isolated Prolects. The individual seeks to
—rT
max [f(T)(l —'u)+Tie —1
where,as before, Ttax rate and r =aftertax rate of interest.




There are two effects: r, the after tax rate of interest, may well bebelow its
before tax rate. This leads to T being larger than without taxation. onthe other
hand, clearly
+ i1T>
andthis leads to T being smaller than it otherwise would be. If there is no
changein the before tax real rate of interest, so
r =r(l—
thenT is greater than it would be without taxation. On the other hand,if there is
no change in the after tax real rate of interest, T issmaller than it otherwise would
be (a negative locked in effect).
9.2 Replacement. Assume now that there is a fixed piece of land, onwhich a single
tree could grow. Again, we ask, what is the optimal size at which toterminate the
project (cut the tree down). We let V be the optimalvalue of the sequenof
investment projects; because of the time invariance assumption, we canwrite—31—





It is immediate that T only affects the optimal value of Tthrough its effect on
.Straightforwarddifforentiation shows that so long as an increase in the tax
rate reduces the after tax return, an increase in the tax will result inan increase
in the cutting size, i.e. trees will be cut down later thanthey otherwise would be.
Stochastic Growth. Following our earlier analysis (Stiglitz (1981)) anduing the
techniques employed in Brock, Rothschild, and Stiglitz (1982), we caneasily extend
this analysis to the case of trees with uncertain growth. Underquite general conditions,
it can be sho.m that if the stochasticprocess describing growth is stationary the
optimal policy can be expressed in terms of an optimal cutting size (termnnionsize
for the project, X*) .Theexpected present discounted value of the project is thus
—rT Ee [(1 —T)+ T] —1
where T is the first time the tree reaches size X. LetH(T,X) be the distribution
of the first passage time to the size X, and letJ(X,r) be the momentgenerating
functionof the first passage time:
M(X,r)=1 dIi(T,x)
0
Then our maximization problem can be reformulated as
max M(X,r)[X(l —T)+ Ti —1
The optimal value of X satisfies
=0
so
(1-X)-i+ -fx(i -t)+ TJMX+ (1 -T)M}
If r remains unchanged, the tax always reduces the cutting size (as in thenon——32—
stochastic case), but th& magnitude of the change, as well as the direction,inthe
case where r changes, will depend on the natureof the stochastic process.
Finally, the same arguments showthatwith replacement, the firms maximization
problem is
XM. -i) max -1,
wherethe only effect of TonX isthroughits effect on r, just as in the non—
stochasticcase.
9.3 Other Provisions. The analysis of the preceding subsection ignoredthe impact of
a large number of provisions of the tax code,which can significantly affect the outcorue.
For instance, if there is a step up of the basis at death,then an individual expecting
to die in the near future may postpone the realizationof a capital gain (cutting
down the tree), eve.n when the real rate of return is much lessthan the rate of
interest (or even r(l —T)).Similarly, for many assets, the choice of durability
is affected not only by the capital gains tax, but equally importantlybytherelation-
ship between the true economic rate of depreciation,and the maximum allowable
depreciation rate.
9.4 Production and Exchange. Our earlier analysis shouldmake it evident that, in
the case where thereis no differential treatment between (short term) gainsand
(longterm) losses, it never pays to exchange an assetonwhich there is a capital
gain prior to the termination of the project (again assuminga perfect capital market).
By the same token, when growth is stochastic, it always paysto exchange an asset
when its usizett is smaller than at the time of purchase.
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When, however, there are individuals at different taxbrackets, then there will
be transfers of ownership prior to the project termination.For instance, assume
there is some tax exempt individual, and the solution to (9.1), T,(the date of
termination of the project for the taxed individual) is lessthen T", the solution
to—33—
f' (T) r f(T.*)
(the termination date without taxes) .Thenthe value of this tree at T is not
f(T), but f(I*)e
r(Tx -T)> f(T)
We commented in our earlier discussion that theremay be an important link
between production and exchange, when ownership and controlare linked together, and
when there are significant differences in different individuals'ability to manage
particularassets. It should be noted that whatwe havereferred to as the termination
of aproject does not necessarily correspond to "chopping down a tree." Itmay,
instead,represent a transfer of management of the tree. The tree with a newmanager
isa different project (in our terminology) than the tree with the oldmanager. The
socialloss then in a delay inthe termination of a project is simply the difference
betweenwhat the growth would have been, under thenew management and what it was
underthe old; similarly, for an early termination ofa project.
Not all realizations result in a change in control;an investor may be induced
by tax considerations to sell some shares at a different date than heotherwise would,
but so long as the number of shares is small, there neednot be a change in the management
(and hence in the productive uses to which the assetsare put). In that case, the
only inefficiency arising out of the capital gains tax is anexchange inefficiency.
If the assets which would have otherwise beenexchanged but are not, are not too dissimilar,
the consumer surplus lost as a result of thisexchange irfficiency may be relatively
small, even though the amount of trade impeded in the marketmay be very large.
10. Macro—economic Effects
Revenue effects
We showed in our earlier analysis that therewas some possibility that a lowering
of the tax rate on long—term capital gains would leadto increased realization of
longterm gains. In the very short run, this would increasegovernment revenue; in
the long run, however, it.is likely to decreasegovernment revenue for three reasons:—34—
(1)The individual is choosing to pay a tax today which he would have had to
pay at some date in the future. The increase in tax revenueis largely
simply a change in timing.
(2)If, as we have argued, one of the motivations tor the realization of long—
term gains is for the individual to be in a position to take advantage of
the ability to write off short—term losses at full rates, then there will
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be, as a result, a negative cash flow from the treasury.
(3) The shorL—run increase in government revenues is partly the effect of
moving from one steady state to another. Within the new steady state,
there are three effects that have to be reckoned with: Given that the economy
is growing, a shorter holding period will be associated with more recent
investments, and therefore with a larger base; on the other hand, the fact
thatthe investments are terminated earlier means that each will have
experienced a smaller level of capital gains; and since a lower tax rate
isimposed, the tax revenues generated will be even smaller.
To see this heuristically, assume the average tax rate on realizations, when
the ratio of the tax rate on long term capital gains to that on ordinary income is
z,is r'z), with t >0; when z is lowered,T is lowered, both because of the
direct effectof the lower z, and the indirect effect of the greater opportunity to
take advantage of losses. Thust'Z Assumethat investments aregrowing at
therate g, and the average capital gain on investments (per dollar invested)
realized after T years is f(T) —1.Thus,the steady state flow of tax revenue
is proportionalto -
- 1)
Differentiating logarithmically with respect to z, we obtain
f'dT T r f dT --.35-.
tf,now,weassumethatthe interest rate is not less than the rate ofgrowth, and if lowcrjne
the tax rate lowers the holding period, thesteady state flow of tax revenues is
reduced. 36
This long r'an effect is markedly different fromthe short run effect. In the
transition from one steady state, withsay TT1 to another steady state with
T —
T2(where T is the average holding period), all thoseassets invested in the
interval between t—
T1andt—
T2are sold, (where tisthe date of the (unanticipat::.
tAx change) i..e. there is a one time saleproportional to
C1 e—e
g
Cldarly, if the transition sales occur rapidly enough, there will bea short—term
increase in tax revenues accompanied by a long—run decreasein tax revenues. Offsetting
these effects there are positive effects fromany increased efficiency in the economy
(resdlting from the reduction in a distortion) and fromany increased savings.
There is., however, no reason to believe that thegovernment should take either
the extremelyshort sighted viewof looking atcurrent taxrevenues, or the extreme
longrunview of looking only at steady state revenues.Indeed, in other contexts,
wehavelearned that focusing on steadystates, ignoring transitions, may be extremely
misleading.
A more reasonable view for thegovernment to take is to ask, what is the effect
of the change in the long term capitalgains tax rate on (a) the present discounted
value of tax revenues; (b) the current levelof consumption; and (c) the level of
private savings and the pattern of its allocation.
It is clearly possible that (evenapart fromthe direct effect of the
loweringof the tax rate) the change intiming may reduce the present discounted
value of tax revenues. To see thismost simply, we return to a modifiedversion
of the two period model of Section3, where an individua] has experienceda
capital gain ofp1 —1.The tax rate on capital gains thisperiod is z1r and next
period it is expected to bez2r, z2> z1 Consider the individual who is indifferent—36—
between terminating the project, and reinvestingthe proceeds in a one period project
whichwill yield a rate of return of g2, so his after taxterminal wealth is
(10.1) [(p1 -l)(l-zT)+ l](l+g2(l-zr))
andkeeping hisfundsin thecurrentproject, which will, over the next period,
increase in value at a rate g1, so his after taxterminal wealth is
(10.2)p1(l + g1)(l -zT)+ZT
In the first case, the government's presentdiscounted value of revenue is
(10.3) i[p1 -1+
g2l -l)(1-ZT)+)}




Equating (10.1) and (10.2), solving for g2, substitutinginto (10.3), and simplifying,
we obtain that the difference in the government revenuesis
T(p1
—1)
1+ r {rz1 + z1 —z2)
Hence, provided that the government's discount rateis not too large, and
provided z2 >>z1, theearlierrealization reduces the present discounted
value of government revenue.
If individuals' discount rates are higher than thegovernmen1s, then if the
present discounted value of tax payments,using the individual's discount rate, is
thesame for an investment program involving shorterholdingperiod as it is for an
investment program involving longer holding periods,then the present discounted
value, of the government's revenue, using the lower, governmentdiscount rate, is
higher with the longer holding period.
EffecsinS. All of the analysis so farhas assumed that when the individual
realizes his capital gain, he will reinvest his after tax proceedsin a productive
investment, and will not use the proceeds to increasehis consumption.—37—
Evex3 if consumption s unaffected, the earlier realization will lead toa
reduction in the level of private savings, by an amount equal to the taxpayment to
thegovernment. The usual argument that the ability of individuals to postpone their
taxes by postponing realization is equivalent to a loan from thegovernment can be
looked at in just the opposite way: it is a loan specifically directedat productive
opportunities within the economy (although the critical rate of return on the invest-
mentmaybe below the market rate of interest). The increase ingovernment tax
revenuescan, in this view, be thought of as coming directly out of private savings,
rather than out of consumption.
This is, of course, only a first order approximation. Wenow need to enquire
whether a lowering of the tax on long term capital gains, and theshortening of the
holdingperiod that might result, will lead to an increase in consumption, thus
further reducing the private savings availablefor investment, or to a decrease in
consumption. Not surprisingly, either result is possible under not implausible
conditions.
First, consider an individual who is almost indifferent between the twostrategies,
of selling capital gains as soon as they become long term, andrealizing only losses;
we can view a switch from the second strategy to the first as a mean utilitypreserving
reduction in the (after tax) riskiness of the investment. Sucha change can be shown
to leave consumption unaffected if relative risk aversion is constant and if all income
comes from the risky asset; if relative risk aversion is decreasing thenconsumption
will increase. On the other hand, if the income from the risky asset isonly a
fraction of the individual's total income, then even with constant relative risk
aversion, there will be some reduction in consumption.
If individuals are constrained in their borrowing, theremay also be a liquidity
effect leading individuals to increase their consumptionupon the sale of their assets.
(See Stiglitz (1981)).—38—
Thereis a third effect: If individuals are risk averse, they will not, in
general, pursue one policy to the exclusion of the other; changing z will affect
the proportion of one's capital gains that are realized. Noreover, individuals will
alter the proportions in which they invest in risky assets versus safe assets.38
The important conclusion of this section is that changes in capital gains tax
rates and tax revenues hive markedly different effects from those from other forms of
taxes. The short—run impact is primarily a transitional effect, representing the
change from one steady state level of ho ding periods to another. This has little
to do with the long—run effects, which may well be of the opposite sign. Nore important,
whether tax revenues increase or decrease, the income effect of a lowering of the
tax rate on capital gains is always positive, leading to an increase in consumption.
Asusual, the substitution effect may offset this. But in addition to these two
standard effects, we have noted the possible existence of a third, liquidity effect,
which, to the extent that holding periods are shortened, may increase consumption.
Equally important, we have argued, that to the first order of approximation,
changes in capital gains tax revenues can be thought of as coming directly out of
funds available for private investment, rather than out of consumption. Just as
social security represents an asset, the anticipation of which depresses private
savings and investment, the existence of the deferred tax liabilities associated
with longer holding periods represents a liability, which increases private savings
and investment.
Within this perspective, it is difficult to know what significance should be
attached to the adniittedly controversial empirical studies of Feldstein, et. al., that
lowering the tax on long—term capital gains will increase (in the short run)
government tax revenue.—39—
11.Conclusions
Thispaper has shown that the analysis of the effects of capital gains taxation
requires a careful modelling both of the details of the tax code and theimperfections
inthe capital market. Under the standard assumptionsconcerning perfect capital
markets and under the standard idealizations of the taxcode, there are several
strategies by whichrationalinvestors can avoid not only all taxes on theircapital
income, but also all taxes on their wage income; thesestrategies leave individuals
consumptionand bequests in each state of nature and at each dateunchanged from what
they would have beeninthe absence of taxes. Although certain detailedprovisions
of the tax code may limit the extent to which rationalinvestors can avail themselves
of these tax avoidance activities, there areways, in a perfect capital market, by
which the effects of these restrictions can be ameliorated.We have contended,
accordingly, that any analysis of the effects of capital taxationmust focus on
imperfect capital markets.
If individuals face limitations on the amounts whichthey can borrow and/or if
there are limitations on short sales, then we have shown thatthere are circumstances
where there is a locked in effect; but thereare other circumstances where individuals
are induced to sell securities that they otherwise would haveheld, in order to take
advantage of the assymetric treatment of short term losses andlong term gains. A
policy of realizing gains as soon as they become eligible forlong term treatment
(provided the gains are not too large) dominates thepolicy of postponing the
realization of capital gains.
While we have constructed a simple general equilibriummodel, within which we
can confirm the widespread belief that the taxation of capitalgains may increase
the volatility of asset prices, and lead individualsnot to trade when they otherwise
would, we have cast come doubt on the significance of the welfare lossesresulting
from these exchange inefficiencies. At the sametime, we have seen that there are
circumstance.s in which the tax leads to productioninefficiencies, e.g. terminating
projects at other than the socially optimaldate.—40—
Finally, we have argued that the focus of some recent policy debates on the
short run revenue impact of a decrease inthetax rate on capital gains is misplaced:
evenwhen the short run revenue impact is positive, consumption may increase (thus
exacerbating inflationary pressures) and private savings may decrease (thus leading
toa lower level of investment in the private sector) .Moreover,we have argued
that there is some presumption that the long run revenue impact is negative.
Although our analysis has focused on the central theoretical issues involved
in capital gains taxation, it has some important implications for empirical research.
In particular, our analysis suggests that the impact of the tax is not adequately
summarizedby a single number, such as the 'effect.ive taxrate"representing the
averageratio of tax payments to capital gains. Moreover, the impact of the tax
cannot be assessed by looking only at reported capital gains and losses.
Ouranalysis also has important policyimplications for the reform of capital
gains taxation, but a dissussion of these must await another occasion.FOOTNOTES
Even then, if all individuals wererational, well informed investors, Isuspect that one should observe more extensiveuse of the tax avoidance activities than
one presently observes. And if capital markets
were very competitive, with a large number of well informed brokers
providing information concerning tax avoidance activities to potential investors, one wouldhave expected that the transactions
costs associated with many of these tax avoidanceactivities would be much lower than they presently are.
2
Thus a short sale is just likea loan, cept that the amount to bepaid back depends on the (random) price of thesecurity (at the time the "loan" is repaid).
This assumption is made tosimplify the analysis. It obviously doesnot provide an accurate description of how short salesoccur. The implications of this for the conclusions we reach are discussedbelow.
For a more extensive discussion ofthe provisions of the U.S. tax coderelating to the taxation of capital gains,
see Stiglitz (1981b)or Minarik (1981).
In addition, we ignore the rulesrelating to the offsetting of long termgains with short term losses. But see below.
If capital gains are taxedupon death it is still optimal to postpone them
until then. In that case, ouranalysis shows that the old adage, "Thereare two things in life which cannot be avoided—deathand taxes" needs to be modified to read "You can avoid either taxesor death, but not both."
6
As I pointed out in 1973, it is difficultto explain why rational firmspay dividends. The subsequent literaturetrying to explain the "dividend paradox" has left me unconvinced,particularly with respect to the tax avoidanceactivities of closely held companies. Fora further discussion, see Stiglitz (1982b).
In Continuous time, all we wouldrequire is that within the year interval, the
probability that the movement of price from theoriginal price exceeded in
absolute value was unity; this would besatisfied with any stochasticprocess described by a diffusion equation withpositive variance.
8If At <A,he will need to purchase an additionalamount of y2/2 and sell
short an additional amount ofy2/2 + A —Atto attain his desired position
We also assume that long term gainsare not used to offset short term losseson a one to one basis. See below.
10
We assume long—term gains and lossesare taxed at the rate z* and simply added
to the tax liability on short—term gains (losses).
If along the no—tax optimal investmentstrategy, he would, in some state, have
reduced his holdings of the risky asset(A+1 <At),and if there would, as a
result, be a capital gains taxliability,the individual must that period borrow
an additional amount to offset this tax liability. If thesale results in a
capital loss, the individual need borrow less.
12
Again, as in the previous two strategies, there are severalways by which this
basic policy may be implemented.13It should be noted that recent legislation attempting to restrict straddles in
the commodity markets has included a set of provisions which, if enforced, might
restrict the kinds of transactions just described. On the other hand, the enforcement
would require a complicated analysis of the statistical properties of the securities
purchased by each individual; if enforced, its effects on the securities market
could be profound.
14A zero coupon bond projising to pay $1 in T periods sells foreT today; the
capital gain is l--e and hence the inputed interest is l.erL.
T
15Similar avoidance schemes can be implemented with uncertain interest rates, but
they require more complicated portfolio strategies for the individual tobe
perfectly hedged.
Though the substitution of exponential for arithmetic imputation schemes eliminates
the use of this tax avoidance scheme when interest rates are not variable, when
they are, a more complicated tax avoidance arbitrage scheme can be devised.
16This list is not meant to be exhaustive; for instance, an individual who is
planning to give a gift next year to a charitable foundation might bebetter off
not realizing a capital gain this year, but rather giving the security directly
to the foundation next year.
17Restrictions on wash sales may still impede the individual's ability to realize
the gain at favorable capital gains rates.
18Differences in tax rates are important in understanding the impact of capital
taxes within a general equilibrium context. See e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz(1980).
19Nore accurately, the individual would have purchased complete insurancefor all
"individualistic" events, i.e. all events which the market can diversify out of.
20This effect may be particularly pronounced if there are both incomplete risk
markets and imperfect capital markets. If individuals could easily borrow (never
faced credit constraints), then the individual could "smooth" the loss of income
which occurs next period over an extended period of time. Thus the differencein
his marginal utility of income might be relatively small. However,if there are
borrowing constraints, the reduction in income next period mayresult in a marked
decrease in consumption and a corresponding increase in the marginal utilityof
(current) income.
21The "price" the individual pays for this "insurance" depends on the tax structure.
If there is no favorable treatment of long term gains, then the price (in termsof
the reduction in the expected present discounted value of his consumption)is just
—
p0),
while if there is favorable treatment of long term gains, this
strategy may actually increase the expected presentdiscounted value of his
consumption, as we saw earlier.22
The assumption of stationarity is important, as theanalysis. of Stiglitz (198Th) shows.
23
Again, we are making use of the assumption of a bindingborrowing constraint.
24Assume (E)> 1,for some ,0<t<1.As before, the only reason to sell is
to take advantage of the provisions for tax losses, in theinterval (t,t + 1.).
Our earlier argument established that if the date ofsubsequent realization was
within the period (0,1), no advantage was servedby the earlier realization. On
the other hand, if the realization was in the interval(1, 1 + t), again no
advantage is served, since at worst the individual would have,at 1, realized his
long—term capital gain without payingany taxes. Similar arguments show that
p cannot be less than 1.
25The analysis of this and the preceding section assumedthat the binding constraint
imposedonthe individual is his ability to borrow. He would liketo take a greaterposition in the risky asset, but cannot. In Stiglitz (l981b)weconsider
another polar case; the individual keeps his level ofholdings of the risky asset
fixed. As he realizes his losses, the tax rebatesare added to consumption; when he
realizes a gain, he pays for the taxes by reducingconsumption. We calculate the
expected present discounted value of tax liabilities associated withalternative
portfolio strategies, and show, once again, that thepolicy of realizing gains
as soon as they become eligible for long term treatmentmay be the preferable
policy.
26
In Stiglitz (l981b),we also consider a discretetime, dynamic programming formulation.
Note that a risk averse individual is more likely to takethe policy of realizing
capital gains as soon as they become eligible for long—termtreatment than a risk
neutral individual; for such a policy yields a positive "tax"return to the
individual in precisely those states of nature when the value ofthe security has
decreased. Thus, this strategy provides a kind of insuranceagainst losses.
27 Inour analysis we have ignored transactionscosts. For wealthyindividuals,
transactions costs are not significant, relative to thepossible gains to be had.
For instance, with the present tax law, with long—termgains being taxed at 40%
of short—term gains, a security with a two—pointistribution {g,—2,} with equal prob-
abilities generates an expected tax cash flow of-r(2.—.4g)if the individual
pursues the policy of always realizing gains. Hence, ifg > 2.>.4git is
clear that this cash flow can be positive while theexpected return to the asset
is also positive. For high variance securities, this cash flowcan exceed any
reasonable estimate of transaction costs.
28
The importance of the relationship between ownership and controlhas long been
recognized, see, e.g.Knight (1921). It has been stressed in the more recent
literature on principal—agent relationships.
29
These arguments implicitly assume a kind of imperfection in thecapital market;
gambles on the price of a security are not restricted to the number of shares
outstanding; and individuals' demands for securities need not be restricted
by their reluctance to sell their present holdings, if they can borrowagainst
these or sell these (or equivalent) securities short.
30
We suspect that the likelihood that the capital gains tax leads togreater
price volatility is even greater then our simplified model suggests. Assume, for
instance, that there are two groups in the population, one of which has volatile
beliefs about the return on the risky security, the other of which hasvery
stable beliefs. In the absence of capital gains taxation, the stablegroup sells
(Footnote continued on next page)to the volatile group when the latter is optimistic, dampening out the price
fluctuations from what they would be if only members of the volatile group
traded with each other. The locked in effect may remove the stable group from
the market (particularly in inflationary periods); since those who are very
optimistic about the return on some security are willing to sell their present
assets, and. pay a capital gains tax, to buy the security about which they have
become optimistic, the members of the more volatile group will not be locked in
to the same extent that members of the stable group are. With only the more
volatile individuals remaining in the market, the price variability will more
fully reflect the volatility of their expectations.
The restrictions on the parameters which must be satisfied for this to be a
consistent solution are set forth in Stiglitz (1981b).
32See also Stiglitz (1973) and Dasgupta, Heal, and Stiglitz (1980). In the latter
we explore the effects of capital gains taxation on a particular class of
productive assets ——exhaustiblenatural resources.
This plays an important role in oil leasing. When exploration reveals that there
is (in an expected value sense) less oil than had originally been thought, there
is a decrease in the value of the lease. In some cases, it may be profitable
simply to terminate the project, to obtain the tax write—off, even though. in the
absence of taxation, the project might be continued.
Similar inefficiencies arise in the estate tax, in the presence of an imperfect
capital market. Estates with large tax liabilities often must sell ongoing
establishments to raise the capital to pay the tax. Note that if capital markets
were perfect, and if the existing management in fact represented the best use of
the resources, then the individuals could borrow to pay the estate duty.
This negative cash flow will not, however, be reflected in the returns recorded
on schedule D because of the restrictions on the deductibility of losses; it will,
however, be reflected in the deductions for interest payments and losses on
ordinary income.
36Even if the after tax rate of interest is less than the rate of growth, (as, for
instance, Gordon has recently argued) the steady state effect may well be
negative.
in the discussion so far, we have assumed that the realization of an asset
corresponded to its termination (the chopping down of a tree). Similar results
obtain, however, if a realization simply represents a change in ownership. For
simplicity, let us assume that all assets grow at the market rate of interest
r, and all realizations occur after T periods of ownership.At any date,
then, there are gT units of assets which were invested T years ago being
realized, each of which now has increased in size by an amounterT —1.
Similarly, there are -2gT units of assets which were invested 2T years ago
being realized, each of which now has increased in size toe2rT, etc. The
total capital gains tax liability is proportional to (provided g >r)
(erT 1){_T + _2gTrT + _3gT2rT =rT—1) —
1—e(rg)
For r near g, the derivative of this with respect to T is positive: reducing
the holding period will reduce the steady state flow of government revenues. On
the other hand, for g >>r the derivative of this with respect to T is
(Footnote continued on next page)negative: reducing the holding period will increase thesteady flow of revenues.
38
Again, a slight reduction in z, which induces achange to a shorter mean holding
period, can be thought of as inducing a mean utilitypreserving reduction in the
riskiness of the risky security. It is known thatif there is decreasing absolute
risk aversion and increasing relative riskaversion, this will lead to a decrease
in the value of holdings of the safeasset.-Ri-
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